

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 MBFR V 00481 061249Z

44

ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 EUR-08 PM-03 INR-05 NSC-05 NSCE-00

CIAE-00 SAM-01 RSC-01 ACDE-00 /048 W

----- 105560

P R 061205Z DEC 74

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0730

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

S E C R E T MBFR VIENNA 0481

LIMDIS

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: ITALIAN DEL VIEWS ON NUCLEAR
OPTION AND POSSIBLE WEST EUROPEAN REDUCTIONS

1. BEGIN SUMMARY. DURING DEC 4 MEETING WITH US DELOFF,
ITALIAN DEP REP (TALIANI) WAS SURPRISINGLY FORTHCOMING
REGARDING FUTURE ALLIED TACTICS AND PARTICULARLY CONCERNING
THE NUCLEAR ISSUE IN MBFR. TALIANI WAS MORE CAUTIOUS
REGARDING PHASE I REDUCTION OF WEST EUROPEAN FORCES.
HIS REMARKS WILL BE OF INTEREST TO WASHINGTON OFFICIALS
FOLLOWING MBFR. END SUMMARY.

2. IN END-OF-ROUND BILATERAL CONVERSATION WITH US DELOFF
(KAPLAN), ITALIAN DEP REP TALIANI SAID WE SHOULD NOT TAKE
UNDULY SERIOUSLY HIS RECENT AD HOC GROUP COMMENTS REGARDING
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 MBFR V 00481 061249Z

THE NEED TO "OUTSIT THE SOVIETS" IN THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS,

AS HE WELL UNDERSTOOD THAT ONLY THE CHINESE COULD DO SO. REFERRING TO AHG REPORT TO NAC (MBFR VIENNA 0454), TALIANI SAID HE WAS AWARE THAT "FURTHER ELEMENTS" WOULD HAVE TO BE ADDED TO THE ALLIED POSITION -- AND THAT THOSE "FURTHER ELEMENTS" INCLUDED NUCLEAR ONES. ROME WAS, OF COURSE, INTERESTED IN THE CONTENT AND TACTICS OF A POSSIBLE WESTERN NUCLEAR OFFER IN MBFR. TALIANI STATED THAT IN HIS VIEW, NEITHER THE PRINCIPLE NOR SUBSTANCE OF OPTION III HAD YET BEEN AGREED TO IN THE ALLIANCE.

3. IN TALIANI'S VIEW, THE BEST APPROACH TO THE NUCLEAR ISSUE WOULD BE FOR THE US FIRST TO SEEK AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE FROM NATO TO INDICATE WESTERN READINESS TO BRING NUCLEAR WEAPONS INTO MBFR IN RETURN FOR SOVIET AGREEMENT TO SUBSTANTIAL ASYMMETRICAL GROUND FORCE REDUCTIONS. ONCE ALLIED AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE HAD BEEN ATTAINED, TALIANI SAID THE US BILATERALLY SHOULD SEEK SOVIET AGREEMENT TO THE PRINCIPLE OF SUCH A TRADE OFF. IF THE SOVIETS REACTION WAS GENERALLY POSITIVE, THE US THEN COULD RETURN TO NATO FOR A DETAILED DISCUSSION OF THE CONTENT AND TACTIC OF THE NUCLEAR OFFER.

4. TALIANI STRESSED THAT ALLIED AGREEMENT TO THE PRINCIPLE OF A NUCLEAR OFFER SHOULD PRECEDE INITIAL DISCUSSION OF THE MBFR NUCLEAR ISSUE WITH THE SOVIETS, AND THAT THE ALLIES SHOULD NOT ADVANCE A CONCRETE NUCLEAR OFFER IN VIENNA UNTIL THE SOVIETS BILATERALLY HAD EXPRESSED TO THE US AT LEAST A GENERAL READINESS TO CONSIDER SUBSTANTIAL ASYMMETRICAL GROUND FORCE REDUCTIONS IN RETURN.

5. ON THE OTHER HAND, TALIANI SAID AN ALLIED NUCLEAR OFFER NEED NOT ALSO PURCHASE FIRST PHASE EASTERN AGREEMENT TO THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT. TALIANI SAID THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT WAS "UNIMPORTANT -- PURE THEOLOGY." HE SAID MANY OTHER ALLIED REPS AGREED WITH HIM ON THIS POINT. THE IMPORTANT THING WAS TO GAIN SUBSTANTIAL ASYMMETRICAL REDUCTIONS IN SOVIET GROUND FORCES; THE ALLIES COULD STILL PRESS FOR A COMMON CEILING OUTCOME IN PHASE II.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 MBFR V 00481 061249Z

6. TALIANI SAID THE CONTENT AND TACTIC OF AN ALLIED NUCLEAR OFFER WOULD DEPEND LARGELY ON US PROPOSALS AND ON SUPPORTING US ARGUMENTATION. TALIANI SAID THE ITALIANS WOULD PREFER TO LIMIT AN ALLIED NUCLEAR OFFER TO THE WARHEADS, AND PERHAPS ALSO PERSHING, IN THE OPTION III PACKAGE. ROME WAS SKEPTICAL ABOUT BRINGING THE F-4S INTO MBFR, AND ALSO "WAS UNCERTAIN JUST HOW FBS WERE

ADDRESSED IN SALT TWO, OR IN VLADIVOSTOK." HOWEVER, SHOULD THE US MAKE A STRONG CASE IN NATO FOR INCLUSION OF THE F-4S IN MBFR OPTION III, THE ITALIANS WOULD BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER THAT PROPOSITION ON ITS MERITS AND MIGHT BE ABLE TO GO ALONG.

7. TALIANI SAID THE ONLY REAL ALTERNATIVE WAY TO GAIN CURRENT ALLIED NEGOTIATING GOALS WAS FOR THE WEST TO AGREE TO FIRST PHASE REDUCTIONS, BY THE WEST EUROPEANS IN GENERAL, AND BY THE BUNDESWEHR IN PARTICULAR. TALIANI ACKNOWLEDGED THE BRITISH WISH TO TAKE EARLY -- AND IF POSSIBLE FIRST PHASE -- REDUCTIONS. HE SAID PRESSURES FOR EARLY REDUCTIONS IN BELGIUM AND THE NETHERLANDS WERE LESS URGENT; BELGIAN AND DUTCH PROBLEMS COULD BE HANDLED BY GERMAN-TYPE FORCE RESTRUCTURING. HE THOUGHT THAT THE FRG DID NOT NEED PHASE I REDUCTIONS, AS THE GERMANS ARE IN GOOD SHAPE FINANCIALLY AND THE CDU/CSU OPPOSITION STRONGLY SUPPORTS GERMAN GOVERNMENT EFFORTS TO MAINTAIN CURRENT DEFENSE EFFORTS. MOREOVER, SAID TALIANI, THERE IS WIDE AGREEMENT AMONG THE WEST EUROPEANS THAT NATIONAL SUB-CEILINGS SHOULD BE AVOIDED.

8. TALIANI SAID IT WAS TOO EARLY TO THINK ABOUT CUTTING BACK ALLIED OBJECTIVES -- EXCEPT FOR THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT IN PHASE I; HE NOTED THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO SUPPORT FOR A SCALEBACK APPROACH IN THE AD HOC GROUP AND NAC DISCUSSIONS OF THE AHG END-OF-YEAR REPORT TO NATO. RESOR

SECRET

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: FOREIGN POLICY POSITION, NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES, COMMITTEES, MEETINGS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 06 DEC 1974
Decaption Date: 28 MAY 2004
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: golinofr
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1974MBFRV00481
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D740354-0725
From: MBFR VIENNA
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1974/newtext/t19741255/aaaabuse.tel
Line Count: 143
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION ACDA
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: LIMDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 3
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: LIMDIS
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: golinofr
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 26 MAR 2002
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <26 MAR 2002 by shawdg>; APPROVED <28 MAY 2002 by golinofr>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: ITALIAN DEL VIEWS ON NUCLEAR OPTION AND POSSIBLE WEST EUROPEAN REDUCTIONS
TAGS: PARM, IT, NATO, (ITALIAN)
To: STATE DOD
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005